I, Gordon R. Thompson, being duly sworn, hereby depose as follows:
Introduction
1. I am over the age of 18 and know the meaning and solemnity of an oath or affirmation.
2. I reside at 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139. I am the executive director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS), a non-profit corporation whose office is located at 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139. In addition, I am a research professor at the George Perkins Marsh Institute, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610.
3. I received an undergraduate education in science and mechanical
engineering in Australia and a doctorate in applied mathematics from Oxford University in 1973. I have extensive experience in assessing the safety and security hazards associated with civilian nuclear facilities, and in identifying alternative designs and modes of operation that can reduce a facility’s hazard potential. My work on these matters has been sponsored by local, state and national governments in North America and Europe, and by citizen groups in those regions.
4. This affidavit supports a motion by the Appellants -- the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone (CCAM) and others -- regarding an order by the Connecticut Siting Council (CSC) in Council Docket #265. The motion requests a stay of the CSC order pending decision on an appeal filed on July 16, 2004, by the Appellants. Alternatively, the motion requests expedited proceedings in this appeal.
5. In its order dated May 27, 2004, the CSC accepted an application by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., (DNC) to establish an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at the Millstone nuclear power station. At the ISFSI, highly-radioactive spent fuel discharged from the three nuclear reactors at the Millstone station would be held under dry conditions inside storage modules located in the open air. Currently, all of the spent fuel that has been discharged from the Millstone reactors is stored under water in pools. One pool is adjacent to each reactor.
6. A press report dated July 14, 2004, in a Connecticut newspaper stated that construction of the ISFSI had begun. Unless DNC has subsequently stopped work on the project or does so soon, spent fuel may be transferred to the ISFSI before the court has reviewed the merits of the CSC order. Accordingly, the Appellants request a stay of the CSC order or expedited consideration of their appeal. In this affidavit I present facts and arguments showing that it would be prudent, reasonable and protective of the public interest for the court to review the CSC order before any transfer of spent fuel to the ISFSI occurs. I show that the risks that would be incurred by going forward with the ISFSI before the court review has been completed, and before consideration of risk-reducing alternatives, are not purely speculative. The damage that would result from a malicious act or an accident affecting spent fuel at the Millstone station could be irreparable within the local community, the state and beyond. National authorities have warned that an attack on a nuclear power station could occur. I show that options are available for reducing the vulnerability of spent fuel to attack. I show that any cost or inconvenience to DNC or other entities from delaying establishment of the ISFSI until court review is complete or a lower-risk ISFSI plan is adopted would be small compared with the costs to the public arising from a release of radioactive material from inadequately-protected spent fuel at the Millstone station.
7. In setting out facts and arguments that support the Appellants’ motion, I am obliged to comment on the CSC order. The CSC failed to account for three issues that are significant for the safety and security of members of the public in Connecticut and other states. First, the CSC did not account for the potential that a large release of radioactive material to the atmosphere from one or more of the three spent-fuel pools at the Millstone station will occur as a result of an accident or an act of malice or insanity. Second, the CSC did not account for the potential that a large release of radioactive material from the Millstone ISFSI will occur as a result of an act of malice or insanity. Third, the CSC did not account for the potential that spent-fuel storage at the Millstone plant will continue for decades after the Millstone reactors have ceased generating power, thereby causing environmental and other impacts that are not currently anticipated.
8. Each of these three issues involves significant risk to the public. Alternative designs and modes of operation of the Millstone nuclear power station, including the ISFSI, could substantially reduce the level of risk. In not accounting for these three issues, the CSC did not fulfil its responsibilities in two important respects. First, the CSC could have used DNC’s application as an opportunity to engage DNC, other interested entities and the public in: (i) identifying options for reducing the risks of spent-fuel storage at the Millstone station; and (ii) assessing the benefits and costs of risk-reducing options. Second, the CSC could, after identifying and assessing risk-reducing options, have required and promoted the implementation of such options. Actions of this type by the CSC could be consistent with the role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a licensing agency for activities at the Millstone station. The NRC sets minimum standards for safety and security at nuclear facilities, but does not preclude the introduction of risk-reducing measures that exceed those standards. Moreover, by neglecting the three issues discussed in paragraph 7, the CSC failed to account for the implications of those issues for matters that are clearly within the CSC’s sphere of responsibility. These matters include: (i) the capacity, in terms of number of spent-fuel assemblies, of the Millstone ISFSI; (ii) the timing of placement of spent-fuel assemblies into the ISFSI; (iii) the physical configuration of the ISFSI; (iv) the duration of operation of the ISFSI; and (v) the land area occupied by the ISFSI.
9. A stay of the CSC order would allow the CSC and other entities to properly account for the three issues discussed in paragraph 7. Also, a stay would allow the CSC to identify and correct errors in its Findings of Fact dated May 27, 2004. I have identified a significant error, which I discuss later in this affidavit, in the description provided by the Findings of Fact regarding the physical configuration of the spent-fuel-storage modules to be used at the Millstone ISFSI. Any cost or inconvenience arising from staying the CSC order would be insignificant in comparison to: (i) the level of risk that would arise from storing spent fuel at the Millstone station in the manner now envisioned by DNC and the CSC; and (ii) the potential for substantially reducing the level of risk through use of alternative options.
10. In the remainder of this affidavit, I discuss a variety of technical facts and arguments. This discussion is supported by six tables that are part of the affidavit although they appear, for convenience, in Appendix A. Further supporting information is available in three documents that I have authored or co-authored. These documents are provided here in Appendices B, C and D.  The documents in Appendices C and D are already part of the record of CSC Docket #265. The potential for a large release of radioactive material to
the atmosphere from spent-fuel pools at the Millstone station
11. When the Millstone Unit 1 reactor began operating in 1970, nuclear-industry managers and regulatory officials assumed that spent fuel would be removed from each nuclear power station after a few years of storage. This assumption remained operative through the design phase of every commercial nuclear reactor now operating in the United States. Thus, each commercial reactor is equipped with a water-filled spent-fuel pool that was originally designed to store a comparatively small amount of spent fuel, typically a little more than the contents of one reactor core. As a short-term measure, storage of spent fuel in pools has merit. Underwater storage of spent fuel shields workers from radiation and allows the fuel's radioactive decay heat to be transferred to the pool water and then to the environment via heat exchangers.
12. From the late 1970s onward, it became increasingly evident that spent fuel would remain at nuclear power stations for a period of decades. To accommodate the growing inventory of spent fuel, the nuclear industry replaced the original low-density racks in spent-fuel pools with high-density racks. This step substantially increased the risk posed by spent-fuel storage. The original low-density racks had an open-frame configuration, so that spent fuel would be cooled by the natural circulation of air or steam if water were lost from a pool. By contrast, the new high-density racks necessarily have a closed configuration. As a result, loss of water from a pool equipped with high-density racks would cause the spent fuel to overheat. Over a broad range of circumstances, exposed fuel would self-ignite and burn. Once initiated, such a fire would spread throughout the pool and become impossible to extinguish. A large amount of radioactive material would be released to the atmosphere.
13. Water could be lost from a spent-fuel pool as a result of an accident or an act of malice or insanity. In an October 2001 declaration focused on the Millstone Unit 3 pool, I described scenarios that could lead to a loss of water from the pool. Similar scenarios could occur at Millstone Unit 2. Somewhat different scenarios would be applicable to Millstone Unit 1, which differs from the other two units in two significant respects. First, the Millstone Unit 1 reactor has been shut down since 1998. Second, the spent-fuel pool at Millstone Unit 1 is located high above ground level, whereas the Unit 2 and Unit 3 pools are partially below ground level.
14. Various options are available for reducing the risk posed by a high-density spent-fuel pool, including the provision of a system to spray water on exposed fuel. The most effective risk-reducing option, however, would be to restore the pool to its original low-density configuration. Excess spent fuel, for which storage capacity would no longer exist in the pool, would be stored in an on-site ISFSI until it could be transported to another site for burial in a repository or for a further period of above-ground storage. At the Millstone station, restoring the pools to a low-density configuration would require a substantially more rapid expansion of ISFSI capacity than is currently envisioned by DNC and the CSC. They envision expansion only at a rate sufficient to absorb the overflow of spent fuel from the Unit 2 and Unit 3 pools as they reach their capacity limit in a high-density configuration.
The potential for a release of radioactive material from the
Millstone ISFSI through an act of malice or insanity
15. ISFSIs being operated and established in the US, including the Millstone ISFSI, are not designed to resist acts of malice or insanity. By contrast, ISFSIs in Germany are designed to resist anti-tank missiles and other instruments of attack. As an illustration of the vulnerability of the Millstone ISFSI, the canister holding the spent fuel inside each storage module will have a wall thickness of only 0.625 inches. The concrete structure surrounding this canister will have ventilation holes and will therefore have no capability for confining radioactive material. Thus, if the Millstone ISFSI is established with its present design, it will be vulnerable to attack throughout its decades of operation. The inventory of radioactive material in each storage module of the ISFSI will be smaller than the current inventory in a Millstone spent-fuel pool. Nevertheless, the release from an attack on the Millstone ISFSI could be large, with severe impacts on the public.
16. One risk-reducing option for an ISFSI would be to harden the spent-fuel storage modules so that they are more resistant to attack. Another option would be to disperse the modules more widely, to reduce the number of modules that would be damaged in a given attack. The options of hardening and dispersal could be combined.
17. Hardening and/or dispersal of storage modules at the Millstone ISFSI would require that this facility be re-designed. A stay of the CSC order of May 27, 2004, would allow the necessary re-design to occur. The land area required for a Millstone ISFSI with hardening and dispersal is discussed later in this affidavit.
The potential for spent-fuel storage at the Millstone plant to
continue for decades after the Millstone reactors have
ceased generating power
18. The CSC order of May 27, 2004, is predicated on the assumption that the US Department of Energy (DOE) will establish a national repository for high-level radioactive waste at the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada. DOE claims that the repository can be opened in 2010, but that date seems optimistic. DOE envisions that, after the repository is opened, emplacement of spent fuel will occur over a period of 24-50 years, a timeframe that may also prove to be optimistic. Moreover, under present federal law the Yucca Mountain repository will hold no more than 63,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel. Yet, the cumulative amount of spent fuel to be generated during the current license periods of US commercial reactors is likely to exceed 80,000 metric tons. The granting of license extensions would lead to the production of a substantial additional amount of spent fuel.
19. The preceding paragraph shows that spent fuel will be stored at the Millstone station for a period of decades, even if a repository is established at Yucca Mountain. Some fuel might have to remain in storage at the Millstone station until a second repository is established. In addition, trends indicate that the Yucca Mountain repository may not open. This project faces political opposition in Nevada and along the spent-fuel-transport routes. Also, the project suffers from technical inadequacies.
20. A recent decision by a federal court illustrates the technical inadequacies of the Yucca Mountain project. The court vacated permissible-leakage regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency and the NRC for the Yucca Mountain repository because these regulations included a compliance period of only 10,000 years. The court determined that this period is not, as the Energy Policy Act requires, "based upon and consistent with" the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).
21. It has been known for at least two decades that a 10,000-year compliance period is inadequate to address the potential leakage of radioactive material from a repository for high-level radioactive waste. This point was confirmed by an NAS panel in 1983.  It may prove impossible to re-design the Yucca Mountain repository to demonstrate compliance with leakage limits over a period substantially longer than 10,000 years. In that event, two options would be open to national decision makers. One option would involve termination of the Yucca Mountain project. The second option would require Congress to reverse its previous commitment to NAS recommendations, an action that would feed political opposition to the project. Overall, one can say that the future of the Yucca Mountain project is questionable.
22. In the context of the Millstone station, it would be prudent to assume that spent fuel will remain at the station for decades after the Millstone reactors have ceased generating power. The period of storage could exceed a century. Adoption of this assumption for planning purposes would have two important implications for the design of the Millstone ISFSI. First, the ISFSI would be sized so that it could ultimately accommodate all spent fuel generated at the Millstone station. Second, the design of the ISFSI would reflect environmental and other impacts, including slow-developing safety threats such as corrosion of spent-fuel canisters, that could arise over a period of a century. At present, the NRC licenses dry-storage modules for spent fuel for a period of only 20 years. The NRC is conducting research to assess the performance of the modules over a longer period, up to 100 years.
The threat of attack on the Millstone nuclear power station
23. The Millstone nuclear power station is one of 65 such stations in the United States. National authorities have warned that an attack on a nuclear power station is a realistic possibility. For example, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, which was published in February 2003, identifies nuclear power stations as key assets, defined as follows:
"Key assets represent individual targets whose destruction could cause large-scale injury, death, or destruction of property, and/or profoundly damage our national prestige, and confidence".
24. Prominent officials, such as the chair of the National Intelligence Council, Robert Hutchings, have concurred on the security threat to nuclear power stations:
"Targets such as nuclear power plants, water treatment facilities, and other public utilities are high on al-Qa’ida’s targeting list as a way to sow panic and hurt our economy. . . . Just this past year, al-Qa’ida attacks in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have demonstrated the group’s impressive expertise to build truck bombs, and we are concerned it will try to marry this capability to toxic or radioactive material to increase the damage and psychological impact of an attack. . . . I have already detailed the terrorist threat and feel it is important to point out that according to State Department statistics, more businesses are targeted in terrorist attacks than all other types of facilities combined. US interests both abroad and at home, as well as US citizens working abroad, are prime targets for terrorist groups seeking to damage the US economy and affect our way of life. High-profile facilities such as nuclear power plants, oil and gas production, and export and receiving facilities remain at risk; moreover al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups’ targets and methods may be evolving."
25. It should be noted that the risk of an attack on a nuclear facility accumulates over the facility’s period of operation. In the case of the Millstone ISFSI, that period could be a century or longer. The annual probability of an attack on a key US asset appears to have risen significantly over the past decade. Further increases in future decades cannot be ruled out.
26. An effective attack on a nuclear power station could be accomplished with a variety of instruments, some of which are relatively easy to obtain. As was the case on September 11, 2001, civilian technologies could be adapted for use as weapons. Consider, for example, the use of an explosive-laden smaller aircraft. Flown by a suicidal but competent pilot, such an aircraft could function as a precision-guided cruise missile. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the US General Accounting Office expressed concern, in September 2003 testimony to Congress, about the potential for malicious use of general-aviation aircraft. The testimony stated:
“Since September 2001, TSA [the Transportation Security Administration] has taken limited action to improve general aviation security, leaving it far more open and potentially vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable because general aviation pilots are not screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at any point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports. Over 550 of these airports also provide commercial service. In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from general aviation airports, indicating a potential weakness that could be exploited by terrorists."
Consequences of a release of radioactive material from
spent fuel at the Millstone station
27. A malicious act or an accident could cause a loss of water from one or more of the spent-fuel pools at the Millstone station. The resulting fire would release a large amount of radioactive material to the atmosphere, creating a radioactive plume that travels downwind. An attack on the Millstone ISFSI could create a similar, although probably smaller, radioactive plume. In either case, as the plume traveled downwind it would deposit radioactive material on buildings, vegetation and other surfaces. The radioactive isotope cesium-137 would be the most radiologically significant isotope in the deposited material. Cesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years and generates intense gamma radiation during its radioactive decay. Being comparatively volatile, cesium-137 is readily released when spent fuel experiences overheating and damage. This isotope accounted for most of the offsite radiation exposure that is attributable to the Chernobyl reactor accident of 1986.
28. Table 4 shows the amount of cesium-137 in spent fuel at the Millstone station. At present, about 120 million Curies of cesium-137 is present in Millstone spent fuel, all of which is stored in the three spent-fuel pools at the site. During a fire in a spent-fuel pool, the fraction of the pool's inventory of cesium-137 that would be released to the atmosphere would be between 10 and 100 percent. A fire in the Unit 2 spent-fuel pool would probably lead to a fire in the Unit 3 pool and vice versa, because the first fire would radioactively contaminate the site to the point where cooling and water makeup could not be provided to the second pool. In some cases a fire could begin in the Unit 1 pool as well. Considering only the Unit 2 and Unit 3 pools, a spent-fuel-pool fire today at the Millstone station would be likely to release 9-90 million Curies of cesium-137 to the atmosphere. For comparison, the 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 2.4 million Curies of cesium-137 to the atmosphere.
29. Some of the consequences of a large, atmospheric release of cesium-137 have been estimated in a recent paper by three of my colleagues. They considered a hypothetical release of 35 million Curies of cesium-137 at each of five nuclear-power-station sites (not including Millstone), and estimated the offsite economic damage. The 5-site average economic damage was found to be about $400 billion. The costs considered were: (i) compensation for loss of contaminated real estate and other property; (ii) relocation costs; (iii) decontamination costs; and (iv) costs of disposing of wastes generated during decontamination. A simple analytic process was used, and the authors relied heavily on a study done for Sandia National Laboratories in 1996. The Sandia study identified factors that could have biased its cost estimates downward, including: (i) neglect of administrative and support costs that could double the cost estimates; (ii) neglect of litigation costs; and (iii) neglect of impacts on downtown business and commercial districts, heavy-industrial areas, and high-rise apartment buildings.
30. My colleagues' paper estimated that, for a release of 35 million Curies of cesium-137, the 5-site average of additional cancer deaths ¯ that is, deaths attributable to this release -- would be about 6,000 deaths. These deaths were valued at $4 million each, yielding a cost of $24 billion. If the release also included short-lived radioactive isotopes, as would occur if a reactor core were involved in the release incident, there could be additional cancer deaths.
31. My colleagues considered a set of direct costs arising from contamination of the environment with cesium-137. There would be many additional, indirect costs of a successful attack on a US nuclear power station, including the following five examples. First, the attack would probably lead to temporary or permanent shutdown of other nuclear stations across the nation, leading to additional costs for electricity supply. Second, domestic and foreign markets for US agricultural products and other goods would be depressed by customers' fear of radioactive contamination. Third, the attack would be perceived internationally as a major blow to the US, thereby affecting capital flows, exchange rates, and market valuations. Fourth, the attack would probably lead to a reduction of civil liberties, potentially including a period of martial law, with long-term negative effects on the economy. Fifth, there would probably be large additional US expenditures on homeland security and, potentially, on offensive military operations.
32. A typical spent-fuel-storage module at the Millstone ISFSI would contain 32 fuel assemblies from Unit 2 or Unit 3 of the Millstone station. Suppose that a module contained 32 fuel assemblies from Unit 3, these assemblies having an average age (after discharge from the reactor) of 15 years. From the data in Table 3, one can calculate that this module would contain 1.8 million Curies of cesium-137. The fraction of a module's inventory of cesium-137 that would be released to the atmosphere by an attack on the module would depend upon the nature of the attack. This fraction could be in the range 10-100 percent if the attack caused sustained burning of fuel assemblies. A fuel assembly consists of small pellets of uranium oxide stacked inside thin-walled tubes made of zirconium alloy, which will burn vigorously if ignited.
33. In the presently-planned configuration of the Millstone ISFSI, spent-fuel-storage modules will be located side-by-side in long rows. With that configuration, a single, determined attack on the ISFSI could cause a substantial atmospheric release of cesium-137 from several modules.
Risk-reducing options and their implications for
design and operation of the Millstone ISFSI
34. In this affidavit I have shown that the present approach to storing spent fuel at the Millstone station poses a high level of risk. Options are available for substantially reducing the level of risk. The highest-priority options are: (i) restore the Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent-fuel pools to a low-density configuration, transferring excess spent fuel to an on-site ISFSI; (ii) take the Unit 1 spent-fuel pool out of service, transferring its inventory of spent fuel to an on-site ISFSI; (iii) employ hardening and dispersal at the Millstone ISFSI; (iv) size the Millstone ISFSI so that it could ultimately accommodate the entire inventory of spent fuel discharged from the Millstone reactors over their operating lifetimes; and (v) design the spent-fuel-storage modules for an operating life of a century.
35. In a low-density configuration, the Unit 2 and Unit 3 pools could each be designed to hold spent fuel equivalent to one and one-third reactor cores, with additional capacity for a full-core offload. Given this design, during routine operation the Unit 2 pool would hold 290 spent-fuel assemblies and the Unit 3 pool would hold 258 assemblies. Thus, 798 assemblies now in the Unit 2 pool would have to be transferred to the ISFSI, together with 396 assemblies from the Unit 3 pool. This should be done over the shortest possible time period, which could be about 2 years. Accommodating 1,194 (798 + 396) spent fuel assemblies in dry-storage modules holding 32 assemblies per module would require the deployment of 38 modules. Assuming that the Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors continued to operate, additional modules would be required on a continuing basis to accommodate the overflow of spent fuel assemblies from the Unit 2 and Unit 3 pools as assemblies were discharged into those pools from the reactors.
36. The Unit 1 pool now contains 2,885 spent fuel assemblies. Accommodating these assemblies in dry-storage modules holding 61 assemblies per module would require the deployment of 48 modules.
37. As shown in Table 5, hardening and dispersal of the Millstone ISFSI would require a substantial increase in the land area occupied by the ISFSI. If the ISFSI were sized to accommodate the entire inventory of spent fuel that could be discharged from the Millstone reactors over their operating lifetimes, Table 6 shows that 208 dry-storage modules would be required. With hardening and dispersal, these modules would occupy a land area of 16.8 acres. The calculations underlying Table 6 do not incorporate conservatisms. DNC, presumably with the incorporation of conservatisms, originally designed the Millstone ISFSI to accommodate 234 modules. This would be an appropriate size for design purposes. Assuming hardening and dispersal, and extrapolating from Table 6, one finds that an ISFSI designed to accommodate 234 dry-storage modules would occupy a land area of 18.9 acres. For comparison, note that the Millstone site has a total area of 520 acres, within which is a Protected Area occupying 49.3 acres. Thus, there appears to be sufficient space on the site for an ISFSI occupying a total area of 18.9 acres. Dry-storage modules might be placed at more than one location on the site.
38. At present, there is no regulatory basis upon which to design spent-fuel-storage modules for an operating life of a century. Thus, attempting to satisfy this design requirement for an ISFSI built in the near term would involve an interim approach in which the best available knowledge and conservatisms would be used. Later, when an appropriate regulatory basis became available, re-packaging of spent fuel into new canisters might be required. The design of the Millstone ISFSI should allow for the possibility of re-packaging.
Current events that support the arguments made in this affidavit
39. Various current events support the arguments that I have made in this affidavit. Selected events are briefly discussed in the two following paragraphs.
40. Publications by other authors and me helped to influence Congress to request from the NAS an independent, classified study on the security of spent-fuel storage. Congress was motivated to take this action by concern that the NRC was not properly considering the threat to spent fuel. The study began in January 2004, and it is said that a classified report was provided to Congress in late June or early July 2004. Congress has requested the NRC to "take recommendations of the final NAS report seriously and to take actions to address these recommendations at the earliest possible date". In a letter dated July 29, 2004, to its power-reactor licensees, the NRC informed the licensees about "measures that can mitigate potential damage to spent fuel in a SFP [spent-fuel pool] caused by a terrorist attack or other initiating event". The measures were described in an attachment to the NRC's letter, and this attachment has not been published.
41. In April 2004 the Holtec company, a vendor of dry-storage modules for spent fuel, asked the NRC to provide expedited generic approval of partial-underground placement of modules. This system would employ the Holtec HI-STORM 100 module. The top of the module would project about 2 feet above ground. Holtec has described this system as offering "the next level of protection against terrorist attacks".
An error in the CSC Findings of Fact
42. In paragraph 9, I state that a stay of the CSC order would allow the CSC to identify and correct errors in its Findings of Fact dated May 27, 2004. Here, I describe such an error. In their Appendix C, the Findings of Fact provide an illustration of the NUHOMS dry-storage module that will be used at the Millstone ISFSI. Yet, a newer and quite different design of module is actually to be used at the Millstone ISFSI, as is evident from Drawing No. 10 in Attachment 5 to DNC's application. The CSC appears to be unaware that use of the new design could have safety and security implications. The CSC's technical understanding of the properties of the NUHOMS module appears to derive from a version of the NUHOMS Final Safety Analysis Report that does not describe the new module design. I have found no evidence that the CSC has confirmed that the new module design has been approved by the NRC.
Urgency of establishment of the Millstone ISFSI
43. The CSC Findings of Fact state that, without establishment of the Millstone ISFSI, Millstone Unit 2 would lose the capability for a full-core discharge after the Spring 2005 refueling outage. Maintaining such a capability is prudent for an operating reactor. Thus, a stay of the CSC order might delay restart of the Millstone Unit 2 reactor after the Spring 2005 outage. This delay might create some cost and inconvenience to DNC and other entities. Interruption of electricity supply to Connecticut consumers is not, however, a likely outcome. A CSC publication shows that Connecticut's expected peak electricity demand in 2005 is 6,716 MW, while the expected supply of electricity is 10,310 MW. From Table 1 of this affidavit, it can be seen that Millstone Unit 2 has a rated electrical output of 871 MW. Accordingly, it is likely that Connecticut's peak demand in 2005 could be met with a prudent margin of supply if Millstone Unit 2 were unavailable.

Conclusions
44. In accepting DNC's application to establish an ISFSI at the Millstone nuclear power station, the CSC has failed to account for three issues that involve significant risk to the public. Adoption of alternative designs and modes of operation at the Millstone station, including the ISFSI, could substantially reduce the level of risk. Current events show that relevant risk-reducing options are receiving serious consideration within Congress and the nuclear industry. A stay of the CSC order of May 27, 2004, would allow options of this kind to be assessed and implemented in the context of the Millstone station. Any cost or inconvenience arising from the stay would be insignificant in comparison with: (i) the level of risk that would arise from implementation of the CSC order; and (ii) the potential for substantially reducing that risk.

I solemnly affirm that the foregoing statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed: ---------------------------------------------- Date: September 1, 2004
Gordon R. Thompson

APPENDIX A
TABLES FOR THE AFFIDAVIT

On the following pages are six tables that are part of this affidavit. These tables are discussed in the body of the affidavit.

Table 1
Selected Characteristics of the Three Units at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Characteristic
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Rated power
2,011 MWt
2,700 MWt
871 MWe
3,411 MWt
1,130 MWe
Number of fuel assemblies in reactor core when operating
580
217
193
Year when commercial operation began
1970
1975
1986
Year when operation ceased
1998
--
--
Year when present operating license expires
--
2015
2025
Inventory of spent fuel assemblies in December 2003
2,885
1,088
654
Capacity of spent-fuel pool (number of assemblies)
?
1,346
1,779
Schedule for discharging spent fuel
--
approx. 1/3 of assemblies in core are discharged every 18 months
approx. 1/3 of assemblies in core are discharged every 18 monthsNotes:
(a) Rated power is expressed as MW-thermal (MWt), the power released in the reactor core by nuclear fission, and MW-electric (MWe), the electrical power sent to the transmission grid.
Sources: Prefiled testimony to Connecticut Siting Council by Stephen E. Scace, 8 December 2003; NRC website, accessed 24 April 2002 and 26 August 2004; Jay R. Larson, System Analysis Handbook, NRC publication NUREG/CR-4041, November 1985.

Table 2
Selected Characteristics of Spent Fuel at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station: Present Data and Estimates for the Future
Characteristic
Unit 1 Fuel
Unit 2 Fuel
Unit 3 Fuel
Inventory of spent fuel assemblies in December 2003
2,885
1,088
654
Average post-discharge age of spent fuel in December 2003
18 yrs
13 yrs
7 yrs
Inventory of spent fuel assemblies when present operating license expires
--
1,667
(in 2015)
1,598
(in 2025)
Average post-discharge age of spent fuel when present operating license expires
--
19 yrs
(in 2015)
18 yrs
(in 2025)
Inventory of spent fuel assemblies on completion of a 20-year license extension
--
2,631
(in 2035)
2,456
(in 2045)
Average post-discharge age of spent fuel on completion of a 20-year license extension
--
29 yrs
(in 2035)
28 yrs
(in 2045)Notes:
(a) Underlying data are from Table 1.
(b) The first discharge of spent fuel from each reactor is assumed to have occurred three years after commencement of commercial operation.
(c) Inventory estimates for the future assume that 1/3 of the fuel assemblies in the core of an operating reactor are discharged every 18 months.
(d) It is assumed that no spent fuel is removed from the Millstone site during the time period covered by this table.

Table 3
Amount of Cesium-137 in Spent Fuel Discharged from Selected Reactors
Reactor
Amount of cesium-137 in
each spent fuel assembly when discharged from reactor
(Curies)
Millstone Unit 1
17,000
Ginna
56,000
Millstone Unit 2
55,000
Millstone Unit 3
79,000Notes:
(a) Data for Millstone Unit 1 and Ginna are from: V. L. Sailor et al, Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools, in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82, NRC publication NUREG/CR-4982, July 1987.
(b) Millstone Unit 1 data are for spent-fuel-batch number 11, consisting of 167 assemblies with an average burnup of 30 GW-days per MTHM.
(c) Ginna data are for spent-fuel-batch number 16, consisting of 24 assemblies with an average burnup of 46 GW-days per MTHM.
(d) The Ginna reactor has a rated power of 1,520 MWt and its core contains 121 fuel assemblies; these data are from the source cited in note (a). Equivalent data for the Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors are provided in Table 1.
(e) Cesium-137 amounts for Millstone Units 2 and 3 are estimated from the Ginna data according to proportions of rated power and number of fuel assemblies per core.

Table 4
Amount of Cesium-137 in Spent Fuel at Millstone Nuclear Power Station: Present Data and Estimates for the Future
Date
Amount of cesium-137
(millions of Curies)Unit 1 Fuel
Unit 2 Fuel
Unit 3 Fuel
Total
December 2003
32
44
44
120
2015
25
59
68
152
2045
12
59
102
173Notes:
(a) It is assumed that each of the Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors operates through its existing license period and for a subsequent 20-year period.
(b) It is assumed that no spent fuel is removed from the Millstone site during the time period covered by this table.
(c) Spent-fuel inventories are as shown in Table 2 or are calculated using the same methodology. Thus, the Unit 1 spent-fuel inventory would remain constant at 2,885 assemblies, with an average age of 30 yrs in 2015 and 60 yrs in 2045. The Unit 2 spent-fuel inventory in 2045 would be 2,631 assemblies, as in 2035, but the average age of the fuel would increase to 39 years. The Unit 3 spent-fuel inventory in 2015 would be 1,169 assemblies, with an average age of 13 years.
(d) Amounts of cesium-137 are calculated using the values provided in Table 3, correcting for radioactive decay with a half-life of 30 years.

Table 5
Land Area Occupied by NUHOMS Spent-Fuel-Storage Modules at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station: the Arrangement Planned by DNC and an Alternative Arrangement with Hardening and Dispersal
Type of area
Land area occupied per module
(square feet)Arrangement planned by DNC
Alternative arrangement with hardening and dispersal
Direct footprint of module (and hardening structure/berm)
190
1,710
Remainder of ISFSI area
455
1,820
Total
645
3,530Notes:
(a) For the arrangement planned by DNC, each module is assumed to have a direct footprint area of 8 feet 5 inches by 22 feet 7 inches, reflecting a long single-row arrangement with rear shield walls; these dimensions are from DNC drawing number DWG-10, 19 May 2003.
(b) The total ISFSI area planned by DNC, for 135 modules, is about 2 acres (87,120 square feet); see paragraph 46 of CSC Findings of Fact, 27 May 2004.
(c) In the alternative arrangement, modules would be located in groups of two, each group would be surrounded by a hardening structure/berm, and the average distance between modules would increase. It is assumed here that the combined direct footprint area of the modules plus hardening structures/berms would increase by a factor of 9 from the equivalent area for the DNC arrangement, and the remainder of the ISFSI area would increase by a factor of 4, both on a per-module basis.

Table 6
Selected Characteristics of Spent-Fuel Storage at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station: Estimates for the Year 2045
Characteristics
Unit 1 Fuel
Unit 2 Fuel
Unit 3 Fuel
Total
Inventory of spent fuel assemblies
2,885
2,631
2,456
7,972
Number of NUHOMS spent-fuel-storage modules
48
83
77
208
Land area of ISFSI using an arrangement of the type planned by DNC
0.7 acres
1.2 acres
1.1 acres
3.0 acres
Land area of ISFSI with hardening and dispersal
3.9 acres
6.7 acres
6.2 acres
16.8 acresNotes:
(a) It is assumed that each of the Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors operates through its existing license period and for a subsequent 20-year period.
(b) It is assumed that no spent fuel is removed from the Millstone site during the time period covered by this table, and that all spent fuel on the site in 2045 is stored in an ISFSI employing NUHOMS modules.
(c) Spent-fuel inventories are as shown in Table 2.
(d) It is assumed that each NUHOMS module contains 61 BWR (Millstone Unit 1) fuel assemblies or 32 PWR (Millstone Units 2 and 3) fuel assemblies; see page 9 of the DNC application to the CSC, 25 August 2003.
(e) ISFSI land areas per NUHOMS module are from Table 5.

 Patricia Daddona, "Storage work under way at Millstone", The Day, July 14, 2004.
 The three appended documents are: (i) Appendix B: Declaration of 31 October 2001 by Dr. Gordon Thompson in Support of a Motion by CCAM/CAM before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (ii) Appendix C: Robert Alvarez, Jan Beyea, Klaus Janberg, Jungmin Kang, Ed Lyman, Allison Macfarlane, Gordon Thompson, Frank N. von Hippel, "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States", Science and Global Security, 11:1-51, 2003; and (iii) Appendix D: Gordon Thompson, Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Resource and Security Studies, January 2003).
 Declaration of 31 October 2001 by Gordon Thompson, op cit.
 Alvarez et al, 2003, op cit.
 Alvarez et al, 2003, op cit.
 Transnuclear West, Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Revision 6, October 2001, page 1.2-7.
 Thompson, January 2003, op cit.
 It is possible that some spent fuel will be removed from the Millstone site for further above-ground storage at another location. This possibility is not discussed in the CSC Findings of Fact, May 27, 2004.
 Thompson, January 2003, op cit, pages 12-13.
 Nuclear Energy Institute versus Environmental Protection Agency, US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, decided on July 9, 2004.
 The NAS recommendations are in: Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, National Research Council, Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1995).
 Waste Isolation Systems Panel, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, National Research Council, A Study of the Isolation System for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1983).
 The White House, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003, page 7).
 Robert L. Hutchings (chair, National Intelligence Council), speech to the International Security Management Association, January 14, 2004.
 Thompson, January 2003, op cit.
 Gerald L. Dillingham (US General Accounting Office), Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, US Senate, September 9, 2003, page 14.
 Table 4 draws upon information in Tables 1 through 3. The calculations and sources underlying each table are described in the accompanying notes.
 Alvarez et al, 2003, op cit.
 From Table 4, the combined present inventory of Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent fuel at the Millstone station is 88 million Curies. 10-100 percent of this amount is 8.8-88 million Curies.
 Jan Beyea, Ed Lyman, Frank von Hippel, "Damages from a Major Release of 137Cs into the Atmosphere of the United States", Science and Global Security, 12:125-136, 2004.
 See Table 6.
 See Table 1.
 The spent fuel with the greatest age after discharge would be transferred to the ISFSI.
 CSC Findings of Fact, May 27, 2004, paragraph 30.
 CSC Findings of Fact, May 27, 2004, paragraphs 18 and 19.
 Washington staff of Inside NRC, "NRC instructed to hire NAS for spent fuel pool hazards study", Inside NRC, 17 November 2003, pages 1, 12-13.
 Jenny Weil, "NAS study to urge NRC to step up spent fuel protections", Inside NRC, 28 June 2004.
 Ledyard B. Marsh (NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation), letter to Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors as Listed in Enclosure 1, July 29, 2004.
 Maureen Conley, "Holtec to ask NRC to approve underground design for dry storage facility", Nuclear Fuel, 26 April 2004, pages 1 and 11.
 Transnuclear West, Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6, October 2001, op cit.
 CSC Findings of Fact, May 27, 2004, paragraph 45.
 Connecticut Siting Council, Review of the Connecticut Electric Utilities' Ten-Year Forecasts of Loads and Resources, 2003, Table 1 (status quo generation scenario).
Affidavit of Gordon R. Thompson
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